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provided for. Hence, where property is kept in the Orleans
Sheriff's custody and a keeper or guardian is required, $3.00 per
diem is allowable, with provision for more keepers according to
the nature of the property. 2 1
Closing Remarks
The writ of sequestration has existed in Louisiana in sub-
stantially its present form since the Code of Practice of 1825.122
The later amendatory statutes have been purposed to broaden the
scope of the remedy rather than to alter or eliminate portions of
the articles themselves. The "jurisprudence" of the court inter-
preting these articles has been notably "constant." These circum-
stances would indicate general approval of the sequestration laws
by the bench, bar, and legislature.
A question which has probably occurred to many a Louisiana
lawyer is why we need three separate and distinct remedies such
as sequestration, attachment, and provisional seizure, with three
totally different sets of detailed rules. It is not difficult to con-
ceive of one remedy covering all three types of cases, with only
such variations in the rules as the type of case may require. Thus,
while no suggestion of change is made as to the sequestration
laws themselves, a definite improvement could be made by devis-
ing one set of rules to cover attachment, provisional seizure, and
sequestration.
HENRY A. MENTZ, JR.
REVERSIONARY INTERESTS IN MINERALS
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently decided two cases,'
Hodges v. Norton and White v. Hodges. These decisions may have
far reaching effects upon the law of oil and gas in Louisiana. It
is to a discussion of these cases and the reversionary interest2 in-
volved that this paper is dedicated.
121. La. Act 136 of 1880, § 23; La. Act 69 of 1922; La. Act 398 of 1938, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1378]. In regard to parishes outside Orleans, La. Act
167 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1338] govern, but do not seem to
change the general rule for charges for keeping and administering the prop-
erty set out in Article 283.
122. See 2 Louisiana Legal Archives, Projet of the Code of Practice Of
1825 (1937).
1. Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d) 618 (1942); White v. Hodges,
9 So. (2d) 433 (La. 1942).
2. A reversion has been defined as "the residue of an estate left in the
grantor to commence in possession after the determination of some particular
estate granted out by him." 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests (1936) 59, § 42.
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. Stated hypothetically, the facts in the case of Hodges v. Nor-
ton are as follows: November 6, 1915, A sold four hundred and
forty acres of land to H and reserved one-half interest in the min-
erals for fifteen years. October 29, 1923, S purchased a one-fourth
interest in the reserved minerals. October 31, 1923, N purchased
from S a one-fourth interest in the minerals reserved on the two
hundred and twenty acres. November 21, 1923, H, the landowner,
executed a release of his "reversionary interests" to N with re-
spect to the one-fourth mineral -interest on the two hundred and
twenty acres sold to S. The defendants acquired title from N to
one-fourth the mineral interest in the two hundred twenty acres.
Prescription was interrupted in 1924 by several oil wells drilled
on the original four hundred forty acres that produced until 1931.
The plaintiff, H, sues to cancel the defendants' servitude contend-
ing that it expired in 1930 by the expiration of the fifteen year
term stipulated in the original reservation. Held, when H, the
landowner, conveyed his reversionary interest to S, he merely
deleted from the original contract the fifteen year limitation there-
by making the prescription provided by law applicable to the
servitude, and this had not yet accrued.
This case presents a different type of reversionary interest
from that referred to in any previous cases. The only prior case'
that has discussed reversionary mineral interests contemplated a
situation where the landowner had sold a mineral servitude and
then sold his reversionary interest which was to take effect when
the previously sold servitude expired and reverted to the land-
owner. This case, Hodges v. Norton, however, contemplates a
situation where the servitude would expire because of a delimita-
tion of a term even though there was an interruption or suspension,
thereby causing it to revert to the landowner. By selling the
reversionary interest in such a situation, the landowner was held
to have removed the delimitation of the specified term, thereby
subjecting the servitude to the prescription provided by the law
in reference to all servitudes.
States that adhere to the common law rules of property,
whether they follow the ownership or non-ownership theory4 of
mineral interest, recognize that the owner of land has three dis-
tinguishable legal interests in the land and minerals after he has
3. Galley v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
4. The non-ownership doctrine is followed "with more or less judicial re-
finement, in the states of Indiana, New York, Louisiana and Oklahoma, be-
sides controlling the early decisions in Illinois." Glassmire, Law of Oil and
Gas Leases and Royalties (2 ed. 1938) 124, § 36.
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leased the land for oil development. 5 These interests include (1)
the ownership of the land subject to the lease, (2) the right to
receive the rents and royalties under the lease, and (3) the rever-
sionary fee interest in the minerals. Unless they are expressly
reserved, they pass with a conveyance of the land to the grantee
without being expressly mentioned.6 They may, however, be sep-
arately conveyed apart from the ownership of the land and from
each other.7 The reversionary interest in oil and gas may be sold
or reserved separately from the soil, rents, or royalties the lessor
is entitled to under the lease.8 There is some conflict in these
states, however, as to whether a conveyance by a lessor of the
oil and gas in the land is limited to a transfer of his reversionary
mineral interests under future leasesor also conveys the rents
and royalties under the existing lease.9 Although not definitely
settled, it has been held that a conveyance of all the rents and
royalties accruing under future as well as existing leasesdoes not
violate the rule against perpetuities. 0
Since Louisiana has adopted the non-ownership theory of
mineral interests and her courts have held in numerous cases that
the sale of an interest in minerals conveys only a servitude or a
right to search," it is elementary that at the time the vendor dis-
poses of an interest in his minerals he still retains in his posses-
sion a "certain object"' 2 that must revert to him at some future
date, although the exact date of its return is conditional and
dependent upon the possibility of various interruptions" and
suspensions, 14 as well as upon the "use" made of the servitude. Al-
5. 3 Sumners, The Law of Oil and Gas (Perm. ed. 1938) 486, § 601.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W. (2d) 457 (1929); Eason v.
Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P. (2d) 471 (1935); Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502,
50 S.W. (2d) 769 (1932).
9. Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 97 Okla. 46, 223 Pac. 835 (1923) held that
the reversionary as well as the royalties under the existing lease were con-
veyed. Carruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Com. App. 1923) held that
only the reversionary mineral interest passed, but no interest in the rents and
royalties under the existing lease passed to the buyer.
10. Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926).
11. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922); Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923).
12. Galley v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940) (definition given
the reversionary mineral interest).
13. Art. 3520, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Prescription ceases likewise to run
whenever the debtor, or possessor, makes acknowledgement of the right of
the person whose title they prescribed."
Art. 790, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The time of prescription for nonusage
begins for discontinuous servitudes from the day they cease to be .. "
14. Art. 792, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the owner of the estate to whom
the servitude is due, is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he
1942]
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though the Louisiana Civil Code provides for the sale of interests
that will materialize in the future"8 and the Louisiana court has
intimated that there was such a thing as a reversionary interest'
it was not until 194017 that the court expressly recognized that
the reversionary interest was a "certain object" that could be sold
before the original servitude prescribed and reverted to the orig-
inal owner.
According to the Louisiana cases that have discussed the
problem of "reversionary interest' 1 8 there are apparently two
methods by which a vendee may become the owner of the rever-
sionary interest of the owner of the land. One method is by ex-
pressly purchasing the "certain object" referred to in the Gailey
v. McFarlain" case, while the other method is by the doctrine of
accretion.20 It is immaterial how he acquires it or by what name
it is called, for in the final analysis the effect is the same, because
all that he acquires is a servitude or right to search 1 that will
expire in ten years if it is not interrupted or suspended. The im-
portant and essential question yet unanswered definitively in our
jurisprudence is: When does the prescription begin to run against
the right to exercise the servitude? If it begins to run from the
moment it is purchased, the vendee may never have an oppor-
tunity to "use" it because the original servitude may be inter-
can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonusage does not run
against him as long as this obstacle remains."
Art. 3554, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Prescription does not run against
minors and persons under interdiction, except in the cases specified by law."
15. Art. 747, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A servitude may be established or
acquired in favor of an estate which does not exist, or of which one is not
yet the owner; but if the hope of becoming the owner be not realized, the
servitude falls. It may also be stipulated that an edifice not yet built shall
support a servitude; or, shall have the benefit of one when it is built."
Art. 2450, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A sale is sometimes made of a thing
to come: as of what shall accrue from an estate, of animals yet unborn, or
such like other things, although not yet existing."
Art. 2451, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It also happens sometimes that an
uncertain hope is sold; as a fisher sells a haul of his net before he throws
it; and, although he should catch nothing, the sale still exists, because it
was the hope that was sold, together with the right to have what might be
caught."
Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 42, 43, § 14; Note (1940) 2
LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 752.
, 16. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Webb, 149 La. 245, 88 So. 808 (1921);
Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Clifton Heirs, 169 La. 759, 126 So. 52 (1930); Gayoso
Oil Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677 (1933).
17. Galley v. McFarlan, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
18. Ibid.; Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d) 618 (1940); White v.
Hodges, 9 So. (2d) 433 (La. 1942).
19. 194 La. 150, 162, 193 So. 570, 575 (1940).
20. White v. Hodges, 9 So. (2d) 433 (La. 1942).
21. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922); Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923).
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rupted or suspended, causing it to extend for a great many more
years than ten. If it begins to run from the day that the original
servitude reverts to the landowner, a policy of land tenure will
come into existence that is contrary in spirit to the established
rule of jurisprudence declared in Frost Johnson Lumber Com-
pany v. Sallings22 as well as the rule forbidding perpetuities. 1
The Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court has ex-
pressed an opinion opposed to any land tenure policy that would
dismember the ownership of the land and minerals permanently
or indefinitely,24 and as a necessary corollary to this position, has
indicated that prescription should begin to run against the right
to exercise the servitude created by the purchase of the reversion-
ary interest from the moment it is conveyed, 5 even though the
owner has no right to exercise it until the servitude on the land
at the time of the purchase of the reversionary interest has re-
vested in the landowner. This viewpoint can be substantiated by
the application of the principles of suspensive conditional obliga-
tions as applied to the purchaser of "royalty" in the case of Vin-
cent v. Bullock.2 6 The purchaser of the reversionary interests
obtains a mineral servitude upon the lapse of the existing servi-
tude. Since its existence is dependent upon the happening of a
future and uncertain event, the principles of suspensive condi-
tional obligations are applicable.2 7 If it is conceded that the pur-
chaser of the reversionary interest acquires a contractual right
subject to a suspensive condition, then it must also be conceded
that he acquires a "right"28 which entitles him to a servitude if
and when the previously sold servitude reverts to the landowner,
from the moment the contract for the sale of the reversionary
interest is completed.2 9 This "right," however, is suspended by
22. Ibid.
23. Female Orphans Society v. Young Men's Christian Association, 119
La. 278, 44 So. 15 (1907).
24. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
25. Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940); Hodges v. Norton,
200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d) 618 (1942).
26. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
27. Art. 2043, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The obligation contracted on a
suspensive condition, is that which depends, either on a future or uncertain
event, or on an event which has actually taken place, without its being yet
known to the parties."
28. Art. 2028, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The contract of which the condition
forms a part is, like all others, complete by the assent of the parties; the
obligee has a right of which the obligor cannot deprive him; its exercise is





the terms of Article 2028 until the happening of the condition.
In Vincent v. Bullock3 0 the court determined that the royalty
buyer did not acquire an interest in the oil or gas, but only ac-
quired a "right" to share in the oil and gas "if and when" it was
produced; that this right was subject to the happening of a sus-
pensive condition, or future event, namely, the production of oil;
and if this future event did not occur within the term specified,
or within the ten year term established by law, this real right
acquired by the vendee expired by the terms of Article 3529.3
1
This same principle could be applied to the purchase of the re-'
versionary interest by stating that the vendee acquires the "right"
to a servitude. This "right" is suspended until the happening of a
future event, namely, the revesting of the previously sold servi-
tude in the landowner (vendor). If this event does not take place
within the term specified or within the term established by opera-
tion of law (ten years), the right to the servitude will expire, for
the ten year term begins to run from the date of the sale.
The opposing position, that prescription does not begin to run
against the right to exercise the reversionary interest until it has
revested in the landowner, may be substantiated by the "ob-
stacle" theory of servitudes." If the sale of the reversionary in-
terest conveys a servitude which cannot be exercised until the
previously sold servitude revests in the landowner, the purchaser
of the reversionary interest is prevented from using the servitude
by an "obstacle" which he can neither prevent nor remove. Such
a situation is therefore within the express terms of Article 792 3
which suspends the running of prescription against the right to
use the servitude until the obstacle is removed. In the recent case
of White v. Hodges,34 the court decided that when the owner of
the land sells an interest in the minerals after having previously
sold all of his mineral interest in that land, an obstacle was
created that suspended the running of prescription against the
grantee until the expiration of the previously sold servitudes. Al-
30. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
31. La. Civil Code of 1870: "This presumption has also the effect of re-
leasing the owner of an estate from every species of real rights, to which
the property may have been subject, if the person in possession of the right
has not exercised it during the time required by law."
32. Art. 792, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the owner of the estate to whom
the servitude is due, is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he
can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonusage does not run
against him as long as this obstacle remains." Note (1940) 2 LoUISIANA LAW
Riviw 755.




though neither the court nor the parties specified the mineral
interest sold as a "reversionary" interest, when the case is
analyzed it is observed that the court interpreted the conveyance
as being a sale of an interest in the minerals, after the previously
sold mineral interest had revested in the landowner. It may also
indicate a tendency on the part of the court to take a position
that prescription against the reversionary interest does not begin
to run until the previously sold servitudes revert. The court
stressed the fact that at the time of the purchase the vendee did
not know that all the mineral interests in that land had been
sold; therefore, he did not consent to the "obstacle";3 5 that he
was not a co-owner of the mineral servitude; consequently, he
could not demand a partition; 3 therefore, there was nothing he
could do to prevent or remove the obstacle. It is submitted,
however, that even if the vendee knows of an existing mineral
servitude on the land or is himself a co-owner of the existing
servitude, there is still an obstacle preventing him from using the
servitude, which he cannot prevent or remove. Therefore pre-
scription should be suspended until his right to search comes into
existence.
Another theory that may be advocated to substantiate this
position is that there is a distinction between the right to use a
servitude and a right to a servitude. By this is meant that at the
moment of the sale of the reversionary interest a right to a servi-
tude is created; but the right to use the servitude does not come
into existence until the previously sold servitudes revest in the
landowner. It is the opinion of the writer that the prescription
of Article 78931 against "the right of servitude" refers to the right
to use the servitude; and since only the right to a servitude is
created on the date of the sale of the reversionary interest, the
ten year prescription against nonuser should not begin to run
until the right to use the servitude is present.
Another theory that may be advanced in support of this posi-
tion is the rule that prescription does not begin to run against a
35. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931); Superior
Oil Producing* Co. v. Leckelt, 189 La. 972, 181 So. 462 (1938).
36. Art. 740, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the coproprietor has established
the servitude for his part of the estate only, the consent of the other owners
is not necessary, but the exercise of the servitude must be suspended, until
his part be ascertained by partition. In this case, he to whom the servitude
has been granted, may compel the coproprietor from whom he received it,
to sue for a partition, or may sue for it himself." State ex rel. Bush v.
United Gas Public Service Co., 185 La. 496, 169 So. 523 (1936).
37. La. Civil Code of 1870: "A right to servitude is extinguished by the
nonusage of the same during ten years."
1942]
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right of action until that right of action accrues, 38 and it has been
held that such a right does not accrue until a party is entitled to
sue to enforce this right 9 This rule has never been applied to a
right to exercise a mineral servitude; however the similarity is
pointed out for the purposes of analogy. Since the holder of the
reversionary interest cannot sue to enforce his "right to search"
until the revestment of the previously sold servitudes, prescrip-
tion should not begin to run until that time.
The second method that has been used as a means of acquir-
ing a reversionary interest is the doctrine of "accretion." In the
case of White v. Hodges ° the landowner sold an interest in min-
erals to the plaintiff after he had previously sold all of his mineral
interests. The court stated the doctrine of accretion, but seems to
have applied the obstacle theory of suspension of servitudes in de-
termining the case. In such a situation the doctrine of accretion
is clearly applicable; 41 but when it is applied the rules of the
suspension of servitudes would seem to be superfluous if not
actually erroneous as the two doctrines appear to indicate dif-
ferent theories. The doctrine of suspension implies that there is a
servitude in existence at the time with the right to use it sus-
pended. The doctrine of accretion implies that there is nothing
in existence at the time, unless it be the right to claim the thing
if the vendor later acquires title, because the vendor has sold
something that he does not own. It is submitted that the case
should have been decided by the application of 'the doctrine of
accretion alone for the reason that when the landowner sold the
servitude, which he did not own, he did not convey a servitude,
but only the right to claim a servitude if he later acquired it;
but, when the previously sold servitudes prescribed and revested
in him, he then acquired a servitude and by the doctrine of accre-
tion this servitude accrued to the vendee. There was no place for
an application of the doctrine of "obstacle" because there was no
servitude in existence until after the previously sold mineral ser-
vitudes revested in the landowner. It seems that a more consist-
ent line of jurisprudence would be established on this subject if
38. South Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Tremont Lumber Co., 146 La. 61, 83
So. 378 (1919); Wall v. Heslin, 2 Orl. App. 112 (La. App. 1905).
39. Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922).
40. Ibid.
41. The vendor sold something he did not own at the time he sold it,
but later acquired it, therefore when he acquired it, the doctrine of accre-
tion caused it to accrue to the vendee. Wolf v. Carter, 131 La. 667, 60 So. 52
(1912); Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923); St.
Landry Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928).
[Vol. V
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the court would apply but one of these conflicting doctrines to a
litigated case.
The application of the doctrine of accretion to reversionary
interest is very limited, because it is applicable only when the
landowner sells an interest in minerals after he has previously
sold all the mineral interest he owns. When the servitude previ-
ously sold prescribes and revests in the landowner, the revested
mineral interest accrues to the vendee who purchased but ob-
tained nothing at the time of the sale except a right to claim a
servitude in the future. In such a case the prescription of ten
years nonuser should not begin to run until the servitude has
revested in the landowner and accrued to the vendee; for until
that time he has no servitude nor the right to exercise or use the
servitude.
The next problem of discussion taken from the case of Hodges
v. Norton41 was not directly concerned with reversionary interest;
however it is important enough to mention, because, by implica-
tion, it firmly establishes a principle of oil and gas law in Louisi-
ana which was enunciated by the court in many prior cases
although it was never made an issue. It has frequently been held
that the stipulation of a term of more than ten years in a con-
veyance or reservation of a mineral interest did not extend the
life of the servitude without user beyond the ten year period,
but such a stipulated term was to be interpreted only as a delim-
itation of the length of the servitude in case there was an inter-
ruption or suspension." It was not positively stated in this case,
but as a necessary consequence the court upheld the validity and
binding effect of such a delimitation by stating that if the land-
owner had not sold the reversionary interest the mineral interest
originally reserved would have reverted to him at the expiration
of the fifteen year term, even though prescription was interrupted
by the several wells drilled upon the tract of land."
The decisions mentioned will undoubtedly encourage the
holders of reversionary interests in their belief that prescription
against their servitudes does not begin to run until the servitude
42. Ibid.
43. The parties to a sale or reservation of mineral interests in which
there was stipulated a term of more than ten years have always attempted
to use the stipulated term to extend the life of the servitude without user.
Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 167 La. 847, 120 So. 389
(1929); Lewis v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 859 (1929). In the
instant case the term was used to shorten the life of the servitude although
there had been user.
44. Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d) 618 (1942).
1942]
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previously sold has reverted to the landowners. These decisions
may encourage numerous landowners who plan to sell their land
to reserve the reversionary interests as well as the mineral in-
terests, as a part of the consideration and price of the sale in an
effort to extend the life of a servitude beyond the ten year period
without user. They may also encourage the owners of land who
are about to sell mineral interests to delimit the term of the servi-
tude so as to prevent the life of the servitude sold from extending
until the oil sand is drained, if there is production within the
life of the servitude. The implications of the decisions are many.
If they are permitted to develop without restriction to extremes,
the ownership of mineral interests in Louisiana may develop into
as complicated a system of land tenure as has developed in the
common law states where vested and contingent remainders, fee
tail and possibility of reverter interests create complications in
the ownership of land and minerals. The Louisiana court has
avoided such entanglements in the past and will no doubt avoid
them in the future.
R. 0. RUSH
STERILIZATION OF HABITUAL CRIMINALS
Human sterilization for social good has been one of the most
controversial problems of recent decades.' Legislation involving
the sterilization of human beings2 was first attempted in the
United States in the form of a measure introduced in 1897 in the
Michigan legislature.3 The first asexualization bill to run success-
fully the gamut of legislative approval was enacted by the Penn-
sylvania legislature in March 1905, but it was vetoed by the gov-
ernor. The first such statute to receive both legislative and
1. See Comments (1933) 8 Notre Dame Lawyer 327; (1936) 24 Ky.
L.J. 220; (1937) 17 B.U.L. Rev. 246. See also cases cited and annotations
(1926) 40 A.L.R. 535; (1927) 51 A.L.R. 862; (1933) 87 A.L.R. 242.
2. Sterilization is usually accomplished by vasectomy in the male and
salpingectomy in the female-surgical operation the purpose of which is to
cut and seal the tubes through which the reproductive cells must pass. Often
in the case of the male the operation Is conducted under a local anesthetic
and requires about fifteen minutes. The patient need not be confined to bed.
In the female, sterilization demands an operation of more complexity: the
abdomen is opened and the patient must remain in bed for at least one
week. It must be emphasized that such operations do not in any degree
unsex the patient, but he Is irreparably precluded from producing offspring.
For a detailed discussion, see Landman, Human Sterilization (1932) cxi, xii.
3. This bill was defeated by only a few votes.
[Vol. V
